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Abstract 
The dominant orientation in both mainstream and alternative forms of criminal justice 
theory and practice employs a single process approach: one that aims to do justice to victims 
primarily through conviction and punishment of the offender. In other words, justice for 
victims crucially involves offenders getting their ‘just deserts’. In contrast, this paper argues 
for a dual process approach: one that separates conceptually and, in so far as possible, in 
practice, the victim and the offender, and employs two distinct systems to serve the ends 
relevant to each respectively. We suggest that neither in principle nor in practice can a 
single process do justice to both victims and offenders.  Rather, we set out principles for 
designing one track oriented to victims and another to offenders, to address the distinctive 
concerns of each in relation to criminal law with parallel sophistication and humanity. 
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In contemporary contexts, criminal justice processes involve multiple participants and aim 
to serve various ends. Participants typically include the defendant or convicted offender, the 
public, the state and the victim.1 In England and Wales – the jurisdiction we take as our 
primary example, though its relevant features are reproduced in similar systems, including 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States – the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
section 142 stipulates that the purposes of sentencing include the following ends: reparation 
to victims; punishment, reform and rehabilitation of the offender; and public protection. Yet, 
                                                          
* We would like to thank Andrew Ashworth, Cecile Fabre, Matt Matravers, David Brown and two 
anonymous referees for incisive comments on an earlier version of this paper, as well as Christian 
Barry for wise editorial advice; audiences at All Souls College, Oxford and the University of New 
South Wales for constructive feedback; and Samuel Kukathas for excellent research assistance. 
1 Because the institutional arrangements relevant to our argument span pre-and post trial stages, 
our discussion applies to both defendants and convicted offenders. For ease of reference, in what 
follows we refer simply to ‘offenders’. Likewise, many of our arguments for a victim-oriented track 
apply in principle to all victims of crime, irrespective of whether an offender has been identified, 
prosecuted or convicted; evidently, however, eligibility criteria would have to be specified, as for 
example they are under current arrangements for state compensation to victims. 
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despite these multiple participants and various ends, the dominant orientation in both 
mainstream and alternative forms of criminal justice theory and practice employs what we 
shall call a single process approach. By this we mean that a single system and set of 
procedures and practices is first and foremost conceptualised, but also in practice functions, 
so as to encompass these multiple participants and serve these various ends.  Crucially, as 
we describe more fully below, a single process approach aims to do justice to victims 
primarily through conviction and punishment of the offender. Put in the crudest terms, 
justice for victims involves offenders getting their ‘just deserts’. In contrast, by a dual 
process approach we shall mean one that separates conceptually and, in so far as possible, in 
practice, at least two of the participants, namely, the victim and the offender, and employs 
two distinct systems – with their corresponding personnel – to serve the ends relevant to 
each respectively. Our aim in this paper is to argue for a dual process approach as against 
the dominant single process model. We suggest that neither in principle nor in practice can 
a single process do justice to both victims and offenders. Hence we ought, so far as possible, 
to separate conceptually the needs and the ends in relation to victims and offenders that the 
criminal law legitimately aims to serve, and enact this conceptual reform in practice.  This, 
we argue, in its ideal form entails designing one track oriented to victims and one track 
oriented to offenders, to address the distinctive concerns of each with parallel sophistication 
and humanity. 
 Our discussion proceeds in eight sections, encompassing historical, empirical and 
philosophical considerations. We begin by describing the origins and motivation for this 
article, both to provide some familiarity with its background assumptions, and to render a 
dual process approach intuitively worthy of the further exploration which the article then 
provides. In the second and third sections, we seek to explain why a single process approach 
has been so dominant – so dominant, arguably, as to have obscured the very possibility of a 
dual process approach. We start to answer this question by considering the historical 
evolution of the criminal law as a means of dispute resolution; turning then to the 
ascendancy of the victims’ movement and the corresponding political climate within the last 
few decades. In the third section, we consider some of the foundations of contemporary 
mainstream penal philosophy, as articulated by influential forms of modern retributivism. 
To anticipate, our key point is that the retributivist focus on the offender getting their ‘just 
deserts’ as central to justice being served invites – but does not in itself necessitate – the 
equation of  justice for victims with punishment of offenders – this being the crucial 
assumption inherent in the dominant single process approach. Although we have elsewhere 
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argued against certain key features of modern retributivism2, it is important for our 
purposes here to recognise that retributivism can embrace a dual process approach yet 
retain these key features – so long as it refuses the invitation to equate justice for victims 
with punishment of offenders or, relatedly, to justify the latter by appeal to the former. In 
the fourth and fifth sections, we argue in favour of replacing the current single process 
approach with a dual process model. We first consider some inadequacies of recent attempts 
to address the interests and needs of victims and provide them with a meaningful yet 
appropriate role within a single process approach. In section five we then turn to the 
theoretical basis for rejecting the alignment of justice for victims with punishment of 
offenders, premised on the guiding values of a state-initiated centralised criminal justice 
system within contemporary liberal democracies. In the sixth section, having established 
the value of creating a separate victim-oriented track, we sketch what it might look like in 
practice.  To maximise the chance of realizing practical change, we build so far as possible 
on existing structures to concretize the conceptual orientation of a dual process approach. 
In the seventh section we compare the view we advocate to restorative justice theory and 
practice. The concluding section briefly revisits the reasons to reject an alignment of justice 
for victims with punishment of offenders. 
 
1. Origins, Motivation, and the Clinical Analogy Revisited 
 
A central preoccupation of public concern about crime is the harm it does to victims. Recent 
years have witnessed increased attention to the fear and insecurity felt not only by actual 
victims but by potential victims of crime.3 This phenomenon may be rooted in a larger 
socio-cultural trend in which victimization is a defining feature of how claims to moral and 
                                                          
2 Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard, ‘From the Consulting Room to the Court Room? Taking the 
Clinical Model of Responsibility Without Blame into the Legal Realm’ (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 1; Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard, ‘To Blame or to Forgive? Reconciling Punishment 
and Forgiveness in Criminal Justice’ (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 665; Nicola Lacey and 
Hanna Pickard, ‘The Chimera of Proportionality: Institutionalising Limits on Punishment in 
Contemporary Social and Political Systems’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 216; see also Nicola 
Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (London: Routledge 1988) Chapter 
2. 
3 Lucia Zedner, Security (London: Routledge 2009); Peter Ramsay, The Insecurity State: Vulnerable 
Autonomy and the Right to Security in the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2012); Carolyn 
Hoyle, ‘Victims, the Criminal Process and Restorative Justice’ in Rod Morgan, Mike Maguire and 
Robert Reiner (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Fifth edition: Oxford University Press 
2012). 
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political attention are made in public discourse.4  Whatever the truth of this larger claim, 
there can be no doubt that a concern with victims of crime has had a significant impact on 
public and political debate, as well as on the policy platforms of the main political parties, in 
the United Kingdom and comparable countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the United States.5 The reasons have been both principled – expressing moral sympathy 
on behalf of victims – and pragmatic. In a world in which not only offenders, but also 
victims of crime, are drawn disproportionately from the less socially advantaged and, 
particularly, from those suffering multiple psychological, social, and economic 
vulnerabilities, the insecurity presented by crime raises key issues of social justice and 
distribution and is hence a natural political concern for left of centre as much as right of 
centre parties.6  Given that swing voters may be concerned about the impact of crime on 
their lives and their communities, and hence about the efficacy of criminal justice policy, it 
makes electoral sense for political parties to enhance their policy offer to victims and 
potential victims of crime.7  Notwithstanding a marked decline in crime since the 1990s – 
albeit following a twenty year period of rising crime rates in many advanced democracies – 
victims’ interests have remained politically salient.8  Indeed, the development of a criminal 
justice policy oriented to both the needs and satisfaction of victims has come to look like a 
matter of moral and political common sense in both national and international criminal 
justice.9 In England and Wales, for example, this has been expressed in government papers 
claiming to ‘rebalance the system in favour of victims’ and the ‘law-abiding majority’.10  
In a series of recent papers, we have argued for a reconception of criminal 
responsibility and the punishment of offenders that may appear to call this common sense 
                                                          
4 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay (Princeton University Press 
1992). 
5 Hoyle (n 3 above) 412-413; Markus Dirk Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of 
Victims’ Rights (New York University Press 2002); Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The 
Politics of Mass Incarceration in America (New York: Cambridge University Press 2007) 77-164. 
6 Ramsay (n 3 above); Zedner (n 3 above). 
7 Nicola Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies 
(Cambridge University Press 2008) 
8 Marie Gottschalk, Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics (Princeton 
University Press 2016) 196-2014; Dame Helen Reeves and Peter Dunn, ‘The Status of Victims and 
Witnesses in the Twenty-First Century’ in Anthony Bottoms and Julian V Roberts (eds), Hearing the 
Victim: Adversarial Justice, Crime Victims and the State (Abingdon: Willan 2010) pp. 46-71; Michael 
Tonry, ‘Rebalancing the Criminal Justice System in Favour of the Victim: The Costly Consequences 
of Populist Rhetoric’ in Hearing the Victim. pp. 72-103. 
9 For example, the development of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and of Special Tribunals 
(such as that on Rwanda) have arguably been shaped by a concern to put victims centre stage. 
10 See the announcement of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 in Home Office, Justice for All: A White 
Paper on the Criminal Justice System (Cm 5563, 2002) 1; Home Office, Home Office Departmental 
Report for 2007 (Cm 7096, 2007) 38; there is further discussion in Tonry (n 8 above).  
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into question.11 Our inspiration is the clinical model of responsibility without blame, which 
sharply distinguishes practices of holding responsible and to account for wrongdoing that 
maintain respect, concern, and indeed compassion – and so can support and enable moral 
and psychological growth and behavioural change – from practices that invite and fuel an 
affective form of blame and its associated hostile expressions and actions, and so undermine 
these ends.12 We have argued that, despite some important differences between clinical and 
criminal contexts, it is nonetheless both valuable and feasible to import key features of the 
clinical model of responsibility without blame into the legal realm.13 Our core claim is that, 
by analogy with the clinical model, the state should approach the punishment of offenders 
by insisting on offenders’ agency and hence a firm attribution of responsibility for their 
offences; but, crucially, should do so without the sort of affective blaming which normally 
accompanies findings of criminal culpability and is part and parcel of the hard treatment 
commonly associated with retributive punishment.  Rather, the state should aspire to punish 
with forgiveness, and to design its criminal justice apparatus so as to maximise the 
opportunities to create institutional counterparts of interpersonal forgiveness.14 Our 
approach therefore shares with many versions of modern retributivism an emphasis on the 
offender’s responsibility for blameworthy conduct as core to the permissibility of 
punishment, but rejects its usual conception of what punishment involves, thereby enabling 
responses to crime that better serve forward-looking ends.  
Many issues are raised by our alternative model. Our aspiration in this paper is to 
address one of the most obvious, namely, its ability not merely to give a better account of 
criminal justice for offenders, but also to cater for victims’ interests and needs.  How is the 
moral and political common sense mandating proper respect and concern for victims to be 
accommodated within a model which appears to give little attention to victims themselves, 
and, indeed, argues for a form of non-blaming responsibility, followed by punishment 
oriented towards forgiveness? Does this not imply a disrespect and lack of concern for 
victims?  And if so, does it not fail on fundamentally moral – never mind practical and 
political – grounds?  
                                                          
11Lacey and Pickard  (n 2 above). 
12 Hanna Pickard, ‘Responsibility Without Blame: Empathy and the Effective Treatment of 
Personality Disorder’ (2011) 18 Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 209; Hanna Pickard, 
‘Responsibility Without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice’ in KWM Fulford and 
others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry (OUP Oxford 2013) 1134-1152. 
13 Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard, ‘From the Consulting Room to the Court Room? (n 2 above) 
14 Lacey and Pickard, ‘To Blame or to Forgive?’ (n 2 above). Note that it is in principle possible to 
accept our core claim that the state should punish by holding responsible without blame while 
rejecting our further claim that the state should punish with forgiveness.  
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These questions demand serious consideration. In what follows, we argue that they 
are best addressed by a dual process approach. But before embarking on that argument, we 
revisit the analogy between clinical and legal contexts, in the hope of motivating some 
scepticism about the viability of a single process model and lending intuitive credibility to 
our preferred dual process alternative.  
To this end, consider that forms of group therapy that employ the model of 
responsibility without blame do not place patients who are undertaking therapy as victims 
and patients who are undertaking therapy as offenders within a single therapy group – the 
equivalent of a single process approach – but rather provide separate groups for each – the 
equivalent of a dual process approach.15 One reason for this rule is not straightforwardly 
relevant to a criminal justice context. Victims may be vulnerable to further exploitation, and 
offenders who are embarking on therapy to address their wrongdoing typically still pose a 
risk; hence placing victims and offenders in the same group may simply not be safe. 
However, an additional reason for this separation is applicable; namely, that the basic 
interests and needs of people undertaking therapy as victims and people undertaking 
therapy as offenders are likely to conflict, seriously reducing the likelihood that a therapy 
group facing the task of helping both is effective at helping either.  
For instance, victims may need to speak to their experience and emotions 
surrounding the crime, in an environment that feels safe and supportive; they may also need 
to express rage and vengeance, in a way which may be raw or unconstrained, as part of a 
process of grieving and coming to terms with what happened to them. The former is 
unlikely to be possible with offenders in the group; the latter may be possible, but counter-
productive to the therapeutic task of enabling offenders to take responsibility and begin to 
change – given that the latter goals are not typically facilitated by environments supporting 
affective blame. Offenders, in turn, may need to express some of the emotions, beliefs, and 
desires that have contributed to their offending, in order to work through them and embark 
on a process of change.  And, in so far as these contain hateful or violent attitudes, offenders 
may not feel able to express them in the presence of victims; or, if offenders do choose to 
express them, this may understandably make victims feel angry, upset, and afraid. Offenders 
may also need to develop a ‘redemption script’ which, whilst acknowledging their past 
offending, builds a narrative in which their core self, although led astray, is and always has 
been fundamentally good, thereby offering a basis for a better future in which they desist 
                                                          
15 One exception is family systems therapy for intrafamilial abuse, where perpetrators and victims 
are seen together within the same therapy session. The use of such therapy is not widespread 
precisely due to concern that it does not offer an appropriate therapeutic environment to victims.  
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from crime.16 Such a script – while conducive to change and reducing the risk of offending – 
may not be appropriate to ask victims to hear, let alone, as co-members of a therapy group, 
to support and believe in. These potential problems are obvious; no doubt there are also 
other reasons why running a joint therapy group both for those undertaking therapy as 
victims and as offenders is not advisable given the distinct ends of, on the one hand, 
acknowledging and addressing the wrong to victims and helping them to heal and recover; 
and, on the other, holding offenders responsible for wrongdoing in a way that enables moral 
and psychological growth and behavioural change. 
It is striking how much these two clinical ends resonate with the ends we might 
hope to have in relation both to victims and to offenders in a criminal justice context. 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the parallel is not exact. Rather, we offer this comparison 
as a way of casting doubt on the assumption that a single process approach is evidently the 
best or indeed the only way to design a criminal justice system.  In a therapeutic context, a 
dual process approach is the better option when addressing both victims and offenders, 
precisely because of the difficulty of designing a single system well-suited to achieving the 
clinical ends relevant to both. Might this be true of criminal justice contexts as well? 
 
2. Explaining the Dominance of a Single Process Approach: The Historical 
Evolution of Criminal Law 
 
We hope that the clinical analogy just mooted shows that a single process approach is not 
the only option worth considering in fashioning institutions to deal with the aftermath of 
wrongful or harmful behaviour. Why, then, has it been so dominant – arguably so much so 
as to have obscured the very possibility of a dual process approach? To answer this 
question, we must bear in mind the evolution of the criminal law as a means of dispute 
resolution and the production of social and symbolic order. Our current system of 
centralised, state-initiated criminalisation developed over many centuries, gradually 
displacing older systems typically initiated and controlled by the victim, their family, or a 
community acting in the victim’s or an associated sectoral interest.  These older systems, 
notably the feud – which were always subject to the risk of an escalation of conflict and 
cycle of revenge – eroded as state institutions claimed further control over violence as a 
precondition for more effective governance. Clearly, this process happened in different ways, 
to different degrees, and at different times in various countries; and private conflict-
                                                          
16 Shadd Maruna, Making Good: How Ex-Convicts Reform and Rebuild Their Lives (American 
Psychological Association 2001).  
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resolution – whether oriented to revenge or to other goals such as the pursuit of 
compensation or social order – persists in most parts of the world to this day.  But the 
eventual differentiation of monarchical or state law from the feud, and of criminal law – as a 
form of public law – from civil law, is arguably a key hallmark of modernisation.17 
For our purposes, the key point about this process is that the central role of the 
victim was gradually displaced by state institutions. The emerging conception of crime as a 
public wrong, or of criminal law as a mechanism underpinning civil order, came to imply 
that criminal enforcement was undertaken by the state in the vindication of a collective 
standard of conduct – and, importantly, that the rule of law and the associated precept of 
equality before the law mandated universal treatment, even-handedly enforced and 
independent of the preferences and circumstances of any particular victim. Notably, 
however, this process was completed only relatively recently. In England and Wales, for 
example, victim-initiated prosecution remained the norm until well into the 19th Century, 
and it was arguably not until the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service in 1985 that a 
state-directed criminal justice system was complete.18 As this system developed, most of the 
attention to reform and innovation focused, perhaps understandably, on formal state 
institutions and the role of police, lawyers, probation officers and other officials.  Although 
victims have continued to play a key role as witnesses in criminal cases,19 in England and 
Wales, for example, it was not until the enactment of the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Scheme in 1964, and then the establishment of the charitable organisation, Victim Support, 
in the early 1970s, that systematic attention began to be given to the interests and needs of 
victims in, and arising from, the modernised criminal process.20 From a historical 
perspective, we find therefore a marked change, from a system initiated and controlled by 
victims and associated parties – and shaped in part, although by no means exclusively, by 
the logic of revenge – to one where their power and role was significantly limited.  
                                                          
17 Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (Oxford 
University Press 2016) 13-117. 
18 Moreover, the possibility (rarely used) of private prosecutions remains. 
19 The proportion of contested trials requiring them so to act is in fact small: e.g. in England and 
Wales, about 90% of magistrates’ court cases and 70% of Crown Court Cases conclude in a guilty 
plea: Court Statistics Quarterly January to March 2014 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/321352/court-
statistics-jan-mar-2014.pdf > 29 (accessed 8 September 2016). 
20  The institutionalisation of the victims’ movement in England (Reeves and Dunn (n 8 above)) was 
markedly different from that in comparable countries, notably the United States, where popular 
pressure from the early 1970s onwards was more focused on mechanisms within the criminal 
process. See Dubber (n 5 above); Tonry (n 8 above).  This political dynamic manifested itself in the 
UK somewhat later (Hoyle (n 3 above), and arguably came to its full political realisation only in the 
New Labour era. See Paul Rock, Constructing Victims’ Rights: The Home Office, New Labour, and 
Victims (Oxford University Press 2004). 
 9 
 
This change has perhaps naturally lent itself to discontent – a feeling that victims 
have been marginalised and their conflicts ‘stolen’ by the state.21  This may have fuelled the 
growing demand over the past decades that the criminal process attend more seriously to 
victims’ interests and needs, and accord them a more meaningful role in criminal 
proceedings.  However, the key point is that, historically, our system of centralised, state-
initiated criminalisation emerged from a system that was originally initiated and controlled 
by victims and associated parties, eroding their power without consistently addressing the 
appropriate role remaining for them within it. No wonder, then, that this very system is 
where we instinctively turn to find justice for victims. 
 
3. Explaining the Dominance of a Single Process Approach: The Logic of 
Revenge 
 
In addition to the historical context, philosophical and psychological forces may have 
cemented the dominance of a single process approach.  Throughout history, influential 
forms of conflict resolution – whether administered by private individuals, or by the state or 
other collective institutions – have been characterised by the logic of revenge, e.g. the 
ancient lex talionis. Although contemporary penal philosophy typically holds that vengeance 
has no place in criminal justice, elements of the logic of revenge may nonetheless remain in 
both our theories and our practices. According to that logic, victims have a right – indeed, 
in cultures and contexts emphasising honour, they may be considered to have a duty – to 
avenge a wrong perpetrated against them or their group; or, alternatively, a public or 
private collectivity may be regarded as having a duty to exact that vengeance on their 
behalf. The logic of revenge takes justice to consist fundamentally in a form of payback.22 
Retaliation is payment owed to the victim or their group for the harm they have suffered at 
the hands of the offender. In other words, according to this logic, it is precisely through the 
offender suffering in turn that the wrong to the victim is made right and justice is served.  
As Karsten Struhl has argued,23 elements of the logic of revenge can be discerned in 
many versions of the dominant contemporary penal philosophy, namely, the modern form of 
retributivism commonly known as ‘just deserts’ or the ‘justice’ model. Retributivists have 
                                                          
21 Nils Christie, ‘Conflicts as Property’ (1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology 1; See also, Steven 
Eisenstat, ‘Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the Victim’s Desire for Vengeance as a 
Justification for Punishment’ (2004) 50 Wayne Law Review 1115; Thane Rosenbaum, Payback: The 
Case for Revenge (University of Chicago Press 2013); . 
22 Karsten J Struhl, ‘Retributive Punishment and Revenge’ in Karsten J Struhl and Kimora (eds), 
When Young People Break the Law (Idea Publications 2015); Rosenbaum (n 21 above). 
23 Struhl (n 22 above). 
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long been concerned to distinguish the concept of retribution from the concept of revenge;24 
and, unquestionably, the current system is distinct from a revenge system in various 
respects.  Central among these differences is that the right to punish is taken out of the 
hands of the individual wronged and any affiliated collectivity and placed instead under the 
jurisdiction of the state or other legitimate authority, thereby supporting more even-handed 
and universal treatment of offenders.25 And there is, of course, much variation within 
contemporary retributivism, especially in relation to the extent to which theories combine 
backward-looking elements with forward-looking considerations of, for example, reform 
and rehabilitation. Nonetheless, retributivism of many varieties is shaped by a common 
precept, namely, a commitment to a default – albeit in some contexts defeasible – 
assumption that punishment, typically in the form of hard treatment, is to be visited on the 
offender in response to, by reason of, and in proportion to their blameworthiness – in other 
words, because they deserve it.26 Is the infliction of ‘hard treatment’ on offenders as a form 
of ‘just deserts’ – to adopt the popular rhetoric – so dissimilar from justice as payback, 
whereby offender suffering is the means by which the wrong to the victim is made right – or 
does this in effect introduce elements of the logic of revenge in a more sanitised guise?27 As 
we suggest in Section 5 below, it is possible for retributivists to reject the logic of revenge 
while cleaving to this precept or core. The point we wish to emphasise here is that the logic 
of revenge inflects many forms of modern retributivism without its influence being 
sufficiently recognised. 
                                                          
24 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1981); John 
Cottingham, ‘Varieties of Retribution’ (1979) 29 The Philosophical Quarterly 238. 
25 Past instances of revenge systems may yet be less distinct from modernised retributive criminal 
justice systems than is commonly believed. Within revenge systems, it is not typically the case that 
any retaliation for perceived harm is legitimate. Rather, cultural norms govern what counts as 
wrongdoing of the right kind and degree to be avenged, and what punishment is appropriate. See 
Tamler Sommers, Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility (Princeton 
University Press 2012); Struhl (n 24 above). 
26 For critical assessment of the retributivist position, see Lacey and Pickard, ‘From the Consulting 
Room to the Court Room?’ (n 2 above). For further discussion of whether retributivism gives an 
adequate set of reasons to explain why particular forms of punishment – such as hard treatment, – as 
distinct from other responses are justified, see Lacey and Pickard ‘The Chimera of Proportionality’ 
(n 2 above). 
27  The definitional place of hard treatment is questioned in  Matt Matravers, ‘Duff on Hard 
Treatment’ in Rowan Cruft, Matthew H Kramer and Mark R Reiff (eds), Crime, Punishment, and 
Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (Oxford University Press 2011); and Matt Matravers, 
‘Punishment, Suffering and Justice’ in Stephen Farrall and others (eds), Justice and Penal Reform: Re-
shaping the Penal Landscape (London: Routledge 2016). Andrew von Hirsch’s influential ‘just deserts’ 
theory does not assume that punishment must involve hard treatment and so stands apart from 
many varieties of modern retributivism: see his Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1993). 
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Consider, in this light, that the communicative theory of punishment as espoused by 
Antony Duff28 – one of the most humane and liberal articulations of retributivism, which 
marries backward-looking concerns of ‘just deserts’ with forward-looking concerns of a kind 
more typically associated with restorative justice – is explicit that the need for hard 
treatment of offenders is a requirement of the justice that is owed to victims. According to 
Duff, crimes are public wrongs – in the sense that the public has an interest in them – and 
hence appropriately fall under the jurisdiction of the state.  However, the reason why 
conduct should be criminalised is the wrong it does to victims.29 Crucially, Duff claims that 
to assert that conduct is wrong, and so should be criminalised, in a way that carries moral 
seriousness, is to commit not only to refraining from such conduct oneself but equally to 
censuring it in others. For Duff, such censure is owed to the public, whose values are 
violated through crime; to offenders, out of respect for their responsible agency; but also ‘to 
its victims, as manifesting concern for them and for their wronged condition’.30 On Duff’s 
view, it is therefore hard treatment of the offender that communicates precisely the penal 
sanction owed to victims – albeit ideally in a way which looks not only backwards but 
forwards, in so far as it invites offenders not only to repent but to offer meaningful apology 
and reparation to victims. Indeed, Duff appears to go further, at places suggesting that one 
cannot truly sympathise with the victim without censuring the offender.31 Hence Duff’s 
original communicative theory, despite the modesty of its retributivist sentiment and its 
inclusion of forward-looking considerations, nonetheless embodies a pair of intuitions that 
resonate profoundly with the logic of revenge, namely, that justice is fundamentally owed to 
                                                          
28 Antony Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford University Press 2001). Duff 
appears recently to have become more open to the possibility that the form of censure appropriately 
imposed by the state in response to criminal wrongdoing may not require hard treatment; see 
Antony Duff  and Zachary Hoskins,  ‘Legal Punishment’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/legal-punishment/. However, our argument 
against the equation of justice for victims with punishment of offenders applies irrespective of the 
form that punishment takes; if the appropriate response is some form of penal censure, its 
justification should not rest on the claim that it provides justice or ‘payback’ of any sort for victims; 
see below, Section 5.  
29 Antony Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (n 28 above) 61-2. 
30 N 28 above 28. 
31 N 28 above 114. Duff also emphasises that both criminal mediation and the process of sentence 
negotiation between victim and offender can be appropriate, partially in virtue of allowing the victim 
to confront the offender and help to hold him or her responsible and to account (162), as well as 
offering a better opportunity to fashion a sentence that offers meaningful apology and reparation 
(ibid 93-96). In this respect, elements of Duff’s theory are forward-looking and similar to restorative 
justice approaches: see section 7 below. On the relation between restoration and retribution, see  
Lucia Zedner, ‘Reparation and Retribution: Are They Reconcilable?’ (1994) 57 Modern Law Review 
228.  
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victims and served, at least in part, through communication of censure in the form of hard 
treatment of the offender.32 
Bringing this pair of intuitions into the light can help to explain the dominance of a 
single process approach. For, despite the fact that the idea of justice as involving retaliation 
and payback may be explicitly disavowed, the two intuitions underpinning the logic of 
revenge nonetheless implicitly remain embedded in much modern retributivism. On the one 
hand, the intuition that justice is fundamentally owed to victims – not simply to society – for 
wrongs inflicted on them by the offender secures their moral and political claim for the 
criminal justice process to address them. On the other, the intuition that justice is served to 
victims through hard treatment of the offender establishes punishment of the offender as one – if 
not the fundamental – means by which the wrong to victims is redressed and justice 
achieved. Crucially, in the grip of this pair of intuitions, the possibility of a dual process 
approach is moot. One process is all that would ever be required, precisely because what 
victims are due just is a process by which the offender is punished.  
The gradual erosion of the power and role of victims from the criminal justice 
process, together with the retention of this pair of intuitions, can therefore explain the 
dominance of a single process approach. But it can also explain why the demand to focus on 
victims’ interests and needs, which has become part of the political agenda from the 1970s 
onwards, has all too often resulted in what Andrew Ashworth memorably terms ‘victims in 
the service of severity’.33 For this may simply result from an equation, explicit or implicit, of 
justice for victims with punishment for offenders. We now argue that this equation should 
be severed and a dual process approach developed in its stead. 
 
4. The Argument for a Dual Process Approach: Victims’ Needs and Interests 
 
Although the origins of our state-initiated centralised criminal justice system were victim-
involving, the aspiration to reintroduce victims is challenging to it on theoretical as well as 
practical grounds. The legitimate power of the state to criminalise and punish forms of 
conduct is widely held to rest on the idea of crime as a breach of civil order34 or as a public 
                                                          
32 For a non-retributive justification of punishment which foregrounds the rights of victims while 
aiming to keep victims themselves separate from the criminal justice process, see Victor Tadros, The 
Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2011).  
33 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Victims’ Rights, Defendants’ Rights and Criminal Procedure’ in Adam 
Crawford and Jo Goodey (eds), Integrating a Victim Perspective Within Criminal Justice: International 
Debates (Farnham: Ashgate 2000) 186. 
34 Farmer (n 17 above). 
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wrong.35  Crimes which inflict serious consequences on direct victims – offences against 
people and their key interests – occupy a paradigm position within this conception.36 The 
state as a democratically elected body is thereby empowered to address those breaches or 
wrongs guided by basic liberal principles of equality before the law, demanding even-
handedness, fairness, and consistency.37 In the arguments that follow, we make the key 
assumption that whatever role victims are able to have within any legitimate criminal 
justice system must be consonant with this vision. 
 Following Bottoms and Roberts,38 we can distinguish three kinds of interests or 
needs victims may be considered to have – even if, as we shall see, the lines between them 
are not sharp. First, there are Service Needs, which include compensation, proper treatment 
at court, assistance in testifying, as well as provision of information about the progress of 
the case, bail and remand decisions, hearings, appeal and reviews, and case discontinuance 
or outcomes. Second, there are Expressive Needs, which include the opportunity for victims 
to have a voice and to give expression to their experience during the criminal process. 
Third, there are Participatory/Decision-making Needs, including offering opinions on 
issues such as bail, sentencing, and parole, which stand to influence decisions and outcomes. 
Note that some of these needs apply specifically to victims of offences which result in a 
prosecution and trial, while others, including compensation and Expressive Needs, apply to 
victims of crime quite generally. 
To take Service Needs first: over the past 40 years there has developed considerable 
provision for the delivery of services to victims across many jurisdictions; for example, in 
England and Wales, the  Codes of Practice promulgated under the Domestic Violence, 
Crime and Victims’ Act 2004.39 As both Hoyle40 and Ashworth41 note, the case for providing 
such services is a powerful one – which does not necessarily raise any particular concerns of 
                                                          
35 Duff (n 28 above). 
36 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford University Press 1987). This is to argue not that crimes 
without direct victims are of less social or moral importance but rather that criminal victimization is 
identified as a distinctive wrong and should be responded to as such. 
37 For discussion, see Anthony Bottoms and Julian Roberts (eds), in Hearing the Victim  (n 8 above); 
especially Matt Matravers, ‘The Victim, the State, and ‘Civil Society’ in Bottoms and Roberts (eds), 
pp.1-16. Andrew Ashworth has been one of the strongest champions of these principles. See Andrew 
Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press 2015) especially 79 and 238-
44. 
38 Bottoms and Roberts (n 8 above) xix. 
39 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (Victims Code of Practice) Order 2006, as 
amended; see https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/2907/made  (accessed 8 September 2017); 
see also the Criminal Justice System Code of Practice for Victims of Crime 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/westmidlands/assets/uploads/files/victims_code.pdf  (accessed 8 
September 2017) 
40 Hoyle (n 3 above). 
41 Ashworth (n 37above). 
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principle. The recognition that victims of crime have not only an interest in the progress of 
the case, but distinctive emotional and practical needs in relation to it that make a legitimate 
claim on our moral and political attention, does not impinge upon the public aims of 
criminal justice or the rights of offenders. However, empirical research suggests that despite 
their obvious justification, the delivery of these victims’ services is markedly uneven.42 
Unquestionably, more can and should be done to provide for the Service Needs of victims, 
as discussed below.  
However, Expressive Needs and Participatory/Decision-making Needs are more 
complicated to align with the principles underpinning the contemporary criminal justice 
system. The classic example of a mechanism to serve the expressive needs of victims is that 
of Victim Personal Statements (VPS’s). In England and Wales, for example, these were 
introduced in 1996, inviting victims to give the court a sense of the emotional, financial, or 
other impact of the offence on their lives and/or the lives of their family.  While the 
contours of this invitation are generally acknowledged to be somewhat unclear, it can be 
argued that VPS’s are compatible with the usual principles of criminal justice so long as 
they are kept within certain bounds. Namely, VPS’s must focus on the impact of the offence 
on the victim and/or their family, and precisely not express an opinion on what an 
appropriate sentence or outcome of the proceedings would be. In other words, they are not 
allowed to bleed into Participatory/Decision-making Needs, and must be strictly subject to 
the prosecutor’s duty to ‘form an overall view of the public interest’.43  
 However, the risks of inviting VPS’s into criminal proceedings are significant. VPS’s 
offer victims a platform to give voice to their experience in relation to the offence and so are 
apt to introduce an emotionally charged dynamic into the process. This may make it 
difficult to keep affective blame at bay, and so result in both an increase in severity of 
sentencing and a decrease in the possibility of the proceedings effectively promoting 
offender reform and rehabilitation.44  Moreover, this platform may pose a risk to victims 
themselves. Criminal proceedings do not contain the resources of, for example, therapy 
                                                          
42 Hoyle (n 3 above); Marie Manikis, ‘Victims’ Information “Rights” and Responses to Their Breaches: 
Exploring the Efficacy of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime’ (M.Stud. Thesis, University of Oxford 
2010); Marie Manikis, ‘Navigating Through an Obstacle Course: The Complaints Mechanism for 
Victims of Crime in England and Wales’ (2012) 12 Criminology and Criminal Justice 149; Anthony 
Bottoms, ‘The “Duty to Understand”: What Consequences for Victim Participation?’;  Reeves and 
Dunn, 'The Status of Crime Victims and Witnesses in the Twenty-First Century'; Joanna Shapland 
and Matthew Hall, ‘Victims at Court: Necessary Accessories or Principal Players Centre Stage?’ all  
in Hearing the Victim (n 8 above) at pp. 17-45, 46-71 and 163-199 respectively. 
43 Ashworth (n 37 above) 438 citing the Code for Crown Prosecutors (7th ed.) 2013 para 4.12.c.  
44 Lacey and Pickard, ‘From the Consulting Room to the Court Room?’, ‘To Blame or to Forgive?’ 
(n 2 above). 
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groups, in providing the possibility of working through feelings and finding closure. 
Meaningful interpersonal forms of uptake of VPS’s within the criminal process are strictly 
limited. Indeed, the most obvious place in the proceedings for uptake to occur would be in 
relation to sentencing decisions; yet, this is precisely where – if Expressive Needs are not to 
bleed into Participatory/Decision-making Needs – VPS’s cannot straightforwardly be taken 
up.  
To be clear, we believe that Expressive Needs are extremely important for victim 
wellbeing and have a claim to be met. This is both as a matter of common sense morality 
which demands that, as individuals and as a society, we make time to listen and attend to 
those who have been wronged and who are suffering; and due to the more specific 
obligations on a state-initiated criminal justice system (see Section 5 below).  Indeed, it is 
hard to imagine that anyone could read eloquent, dignified and heart-rending testimonials 
from victims,45 and conclude otherwise. But giving victims a platform for self-expression 
which risks them feeling their voice is not valued or heard – for which there is no adequate 
institutionalised uptake – arguably creates the possibility for secondary victimisation at the 
hands of the criminal justice system itself.46  
 With respect to Participatory/Decision-making Needs, many jurisdictions do license 
involvement of this kind. In New Zealand, family impact statements are allowed to affect 
sentences. Research in the United States suggests that, notwithstanding any intention to 
limit them to Expressive Needs only, VPS’s have offender-regarding and system-regarding 
effects: in potentially capital cases, for example, they increase the probability of a death 
sentence.47  In international law, too, the victim has on occasion been accorded a special 
status, including having standing in proceedings before the International Criminal Court 
and certain rights of compensation.48 And, in England and Wales, with respect to offenders 
sentenced to life and some other categories, victims have a right to be consulted by 
probation services about their release, with the Parole Board obliged to take these views 
                                                          
45 Bottoms and Roberts (n 8 above).  
46 Susan A Bandes, ‘Victims, "Closure," and the Sociology of Emotion' (2009) 72 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 1;  Julian V Roberts and Edna Erez, ‘Communication at Sentencing: The 
Expressive Function of Victim Impact Statements’; Paul Rock, ‘Hearing the Victims on Crime: The 
Delivery of Impact Statements as Ritual Behaviour in Four London Trials for Murder and 
Manslaughter’,  both in Hearing the Victim (n 8 above) at pp.232-254 and 200-231 respectively. 
47 Ray Paternoster and Jerome Deise, ‘A Heavy Thumb on the Scale: The Effect of Victim Impact 
Evidence on Capital Decision Making’ (2011) 49 Criminology 129. 
48 See Carolyn Hoyle, ‘Can International Justice Be Restorative Justice? The Role of Reparations’ in 
Nicola Frances Palmer, Philip Clark and Danielle Granville (eds), Critical Perspectives in Transitional 
Justice (Intersentia 2011); Hoyle (n 3 above); M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of 
Victims’ Rights’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 203.  
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into account.49 Such Participatory/Decision-making Needs – and the bleeding of Expressive 
Needs into them – are not easily reconciled with the liberal principles of even-handedness, 
fairness, and consistency that guide modern criminal law, introducing as they do the 
possibility of differential treatment for otherwise similarly situated offenders on the basis of 
the contingency of the victim’s feelings, opinions or preferences, as well as their capacity 
effectively to express these.50 They should therefore be rejected as inconsonant with the 
vision underlying our contemporary criminal justice system.  
Creating a victim-oriented track that runs separately from but parallel to the track 
for offenders – with designated government funds and personnel to respond to victims and 
address their legitimate interests and needs – would in principle provide a focused means of 
addressing victims while preserving the integrity of the criminal process. For example, it 
would facilitate tailor-made service provision, unencumbered by the aims and constraints of 
the track for offenders. And, in particular, it could include more specialised therapeutic 
services to enable victims to address their experience and emotions surrounding the crime, 
thereby providing an adequate and appropriate context for Expressive Needs to be met. In 
other words, a victim-oriented track stands to address the wrongs done to victims in a way 
which makes a genuine difference to their wellbeing. As we now argue, this is a kind of 
justice for victims – as distinct from punishment of the offender – which we ought, as a 
society, to provide as part and parcel of the criminal justice system.  
 
5. The Argument for a Dual Process Approach: Duties of the State and Excising 
the Logic of Revenge 
 
As noted above, criminal law accords a central place to crimes with direct victims as the 
prototype of conduct constituting a public wrong or breach of civil order such as to warrant 
criminalisation as opposed to other forms of public regulation. Indeed a commonly held 
justification for the establishment of a criminal justice system is the fact that such conduct is 
voluntary and the cause of serious harm to victims.51 This is widely taken to imply a special 
responsibility to victims – namely, to recognise and address this serious harm – on the part 
of a state-initiated criminal justice system, which is over and above the state’s more general 
                                                          
49The Parole Board Working with Others, ‘Information for Victims’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/427392/Parole
_Board_-_Information_for_Victims.pdf> accessed 25 October 2016; National Offender Management 
Service, Victim Contact Scheme Guidance Manual (NOMS 2013).  
50 Bottoms and Roberts (n 8 above). 
51 See the discussion of Duff following n 28 above; Feinberg (n 36 above); Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s 
Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2016) ch 8 and 9.  
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welfare duties to all those within its borders.  It is therefore difficult to see why anyone 
would object in principle to the enhancement of what is offered to victims on a single process 
model – namely, punishment of the offender – by a further commitment to the creation of a 
separate and additional victim-oriented track of dedicated services and provision, to address 
legitimate Service and Expressive Needs. Rather, any resistance is likely to concern the 
further claim made by a dual process model, namely, that the creation of a victim-oriented 
track ought to be conceptually and practically distinct, so far as possible, from the offender-
oriented track, and so implies the removal of victims and their right to involvement and 
address by the latter. In other words, the point at issue between a dual and single process 
approach is fundamentally whether, even if part of justice for victims involves a commitment 
to their wellbeing in relation to the harms perpetrated by the crime and the burdens of any 
criminal proceedings, this could possibly be all of it. We therefore aim in this section to 
address head-on the intuition that justice for victims demands punishment of offenders; first, 
by demonstrating the value of introducing a sharper line between the appropriate nature 
and enactment of justice for victims and the legitimate punishment of offenders by the state; 
and, second, by laying down a challenge to opponents of a dual process approach, to justify 
the intuition in question. 
 One reason to draw this line more sharply is practical; namely, that if offenders are 
not punished while this intuition remains, victims may feel that they in effect fail to get 
justice.52 This is, indeed, all too real a problem with the current single process approach. 
Defendants may not be convicted for a host of reasons apart from their innocence, such as 
procedural mistrial, mistaken verdicts, inadequate evidence, or, even worse, a prejudicial 
discrediting of victim testimony.  Many offenders are not prosecuted, or even identified.  
Given the limited service provision for victims, alongside widespread societal cleavage to 
the intuition that justice for victims is served through punishment of offenders, it is natural 
to feel that failures to convict and punish in cases such as these ipso facto result in failures 
to address the wrong done to the victim.  
Indeed, the adversarial nature of the current single process system may further 
contribute to this problem.  Given the propensity of the procedures and rituals of the courts 
to create a climate of side-taking, victims and those who stand accused in effect come to be 
pitted against one another. This cannot but reduce the possibility that a single process could 
satisfy the ends relevant to each party, for, once a side is taken, interests and allegiances 
                                                          
52 This is the kind of concern which Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and Special Tribunals 
aim to address in international contexts; see (n 9 above).  
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naturally lie with the chosen party, at the expense of the other.53 In conjunction with 
widespread societal cleavage to the intuition that justice for victims is served through 
punishment of the offender, side-taking risks that victims may feel devalued if the court does 
not convict, especially for the kinds of reasons listed above and if the victim is convinced of 
the defendant’s guilt.  
By contrast, on a dual process approach, whereby the appropriate treatment of 
victims is conceptually and, so far as possible, practically distinguished from whatever 
treatment is accorded offenders, this risk would be mitigated. A clear and well-articulated 
state commitment to victim wellbeing as a form of justice, embodied in a victim-oriented set 
of services  and practices that are carefully distinguished from offender-oriented procedures, 
has the potential to change societal and hence individual victims’ expectations and, 
correspondingly, experiences.  If punishment of offenders is no longer conceptualised as the 
fundamental means by which victims achieve justice, and if in addition victims feel the harm 
they have suffered is genuinely addressed through provisions designed to improve their 
wellbeing, it is reasonable to hope that, as a result, victims may be less dependent on 
conviction and punishment of offenders in order to feel that justice is served and that the 
wrong to them has been adequately addressed. 
 But there are, in addition, reasons of principle for resisting an alignment between 
punishment of offenders and justice for victims. For despite the centrality of crimes with 
direct victims to the conceptualisation and justification of criminal law, there is nothing 
about the modern vision of a state-initiated criminal justice system that necessitates or 
indeed justifies the intuition that the state owes victims, as individuals, punishment of ‘their’ 
offender. This vision rather suggests that the state should be thought of as owing all 
citizens, as a collective, a criminal justice system that is fair, just, effective as far as possible, 
and aims to embody the moral and political values of a liberal society in its response to 
crime. In other words, the fact that the state owes punishment of offenders who commit 
public wrongs to its citizenship as a whole does not license the inference that the state owes 
punishment of particular offenders to the particular victims who have been wronged by those 
offenders. The fact that a form of conduct is legitimately subject to criminalisation because it 
                                                          
53 Peter DeScioli and Robert Kurzban argue that our capacity for moral condemnation has evolved 
to allow by-standers to coordinate when there is a conflict between two parties. Choosing sides 
based on a public signal – e.g. an action that violates a known rule – means the winning party can be 
decided by strength of numbers, without incurring the costs of fighting. See Peter DeScioli and 
Robert Kurzban, ‘A Solution to the Mysteries of Morality’ (2013) 139 Psychological Bulletin 477.  If 
correct, this hypothesis explains why adversarial contexts geared towards the making of evaluative 
judgments – such as criminal proceedings – carry high risks of side-taking, as that is precisely their 
evolved function.  
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victimizes does not ipso facto create individual rights to offender punishment in individual 
victims. This is a further and as yet unjustified assumption.  
Moreover, any inclination we may have to make this assumption is arguably an 
expression of remnants of the logic of revenge – a return to the idea of justice as retaliation 
and payback. For, where else would it come from? Recall that, on a dual process model of 
the sort we are advocating, there is no question as to the appropriateness of state 
punishment of offenders or of the right of the citizenship as a whole to have public wrongs 
or breaches of the civil order robustly addressed. The issue is only whether punishment of 
particular offenders is owed as a matter of justice to particular victims. Hence, it is not only 
that this claim stands in need of justification. If we are to uphold the modern vision of a 
state-initiated criminal justice system as committed to embracing the rule of law and 
rejecting the logic of revenge – an aim widely shared in contemporary penal philosophy and 
embraced by most leading retributivists, including Andrew Ashworth, Antony Duff, and 
Andrew von Hirsch54 – then whatever justification is provided must eschew the logic of 
revenge. Unless and until such a justification is provided, we therefore suggest that what is 
legitimately owed to particular victims by the modern state as a matter of criminal justice 
cannot be punishment of ‘their’ offender. This goes beyond the correct claim that even-
handed, fair, and consistent punishment of all offenders is owed by the state to the 
citizenship as a whole; and that it is only appropriately considered in any particular case if 
the offender is blameworthy.55  In the absence of such justification, the special responsibility 
that the state has to victims of crime as individuals – as opposed to the citizenship as a 
collective – is recognition of the harm done to them via a serious and sustained attempt to 
address its impact on their wellbeing and to serve their interests and needs in meaningful 
terms. This is most naturally implemented via a dedicated set of services and provisions 
apart from the offender-oriented criminal process: a dual process model.  
We do not, of course, deny that many people in our society – victims included – 
adhere to the intuition that justice for victims is served through punishment of offenders. 
Indeed, in so far as we are correct that this intuition is an expression of remnants of the 
                                                          
54 For an exception, see Michael S Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press 2010).  
55 Indeed, it also goes beyond the stronger, retributivist claim that blameworthiness not only 
justifies the consideration of punishment but positively favours it because the offender deserves it. 
Even this does not yet establish that the offender deserves it because that is what justice for victims 
demands. For discussion of ideas of desert and forms of retributivism, see Mitchell Berman, ‘Two 
Kinds of Retributivism’  (2011) in R A Duff and S Green (eds) The Philosophical Foundations of 
Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2011) and 'Modest Retributivism' (2016) in K K Ferzan and 
S J Morse (eds) Legal, Moral and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S. Moore (Oxford 
University Press 2016) pp. 35-47.  
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logic of revenge and so stems from an instinct for retaliation and payback, it likely runs 
deep in human psychology – even if competing instincts, e.g. towards forgiveness, are just 
as strong.56 We deny, rather, that this intuition reflects an invariant moral truth and that it 
should be upheld – in absence of a justification that is as yet not forthcoming. Importantly, 
this point can be embraced not only by theorists sympathetic to our attempt to 
reconceptualise criminal responsibility and punishment according to the clinical model of 
responsibility without blame, but equally by theorists who remain committed to a more 
standard retributive approach to punishment as ‘just deserts’ – so long as these theorists do 
not maintain that such punishment is expressive of what the state owes to victims, as 
opposed to requiring a distinctive source for its justification.57  Rather, the burden of our 
argument thus far has been to establish that a single process approach is neither inevitable 
nor, on multiple empirical as well as principled grounds, desirable. The vision of a 
modernised criminal justice system – and the multiple ends it strives to achieve – are better 
served by a dual process model, with a dedicated track for victims and a dedicated track for 
offenders, of equal humanity and sophistication.  
 
6. Designing a Victim-Oriented Track 
 
How, then, should the victim track of a dual process model be constructed? Here we can 
only sketch its basic shape; and we acknowledge the many practical obstacles to enacting it.  
But a crucial preliminary point is that, in England and Wales and other similar 
jurisdications, we do not start from a blank slate, but have many sources of information and 
institutions upon which to draw.  
First and foremost, the design of a victim-oriented process must be victim-centred, 
in that it seeks to hear and respond to the voices of victims themselves. There is a growing 
body of research on what victims find wanting in the current system;58 and we can design 
research to further clarify what victims would ideally like to see by way of support and 
service provision. There is however one important caveat, namely that, in so far as victims 
identify as one of their needs that vengeance or hard treatment be visited on the offender, a 
dual process approach cannot accommodate this – any more than a state-initiated single 
                                                          
56 Michael E McCullough, Robert Kurzban and Benjamin A Tabak, ‘Cognitive Systems for Revenge 
and Forgiveness’ (2013) 36 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1. 
57 Note that forms of retributivism that justify punishment as an intrinsic good will straightforwardly 
be able to meet this requirement. For discussion, see Berman (n 55 above). 
58 Bottoms and Roberts (n 8 above); Julian V Roberts, ‘Listening to the Crime Victim: Evaluating 
Victim Input at Sentencing and Parole' in M Tonry (ed), Crime and Justice vol 38 (University of 
Chicago Press 2009); Manikis, n 42 above. 
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process approach legitimately can – because this would be to sacrifice the overarching goods 
of justice and the rule of law, as well as to return to the logic of revenge. Nonetheless, a dual 
process approach can aim to address – as opposed to satisfy – even this need via other 
means, in particular, provision within the track for victims of adequate specialised 
therapeutic services, enabling victims to give expression to their experience and emotions – 
including the desire for revenge – within a validating and caring environment. In this 
respect, the victim-oriented track of a dual process approach ought to work in partnership, 
where possible, with publicly-funded mental health services. This sort of partnership 
already exists between the criminal justice system and publicly-funded forensic services. 
Although a great deal more needs to be done to provide adequate care for the mental health 
needs of offenders, it is striking that no parallel intervention is part of the criminal justice 
system’s responsibility to victims. This must be part and parcel of any adequately designed 
victim-oriented track. 
Second, there are existing institutions and practices to draw on. The original 
conception of Victim Support, as a victim-centred organisation in England and Wales 
operating parallel to and separately from the single track of the criminal process, remains a 
promising model on which to build.  But although the charitable status of the organisation 
might be thought to underline this valuable, victim-centric autonomy, this potential 
advantage is offset by uncertainties about the provision of the funding on which its activities 
depend. It is key to our argument that the victim-oriented track is a public responsibility 
just as much as the offender-oriented track. It is therefore a requirement of a dual process 
approach that adequate funding of the victim-oriented track be put on a statutory basis. We 
do not under-estimate the challenge this poses. Recent cuts in public provision for victims’ 
services and indeed welfare services more generally across jurisdictions – in England and 
Wales, notably services to victims of domestic violence and abuse, including the provision of 
accommodation – are exemplary of the difficulty to be faced. But the moral case for public 
funding of an autonomous victim-oriented track, with a specialised staff with a range of 
therapeutic, social work, and legal skills, is a strong one. The duty which a state that 
establishes a criminal justice system owes to victims of crime is not fulfilled where it is left 
to the uncertainties of philanthropic donation or local discretion.   
Third, we must address how best to manage victims’ interests and needs in relation 
to their inevitable role in contested cases as witnesses in the offender-oriented track.  A dual 
process approach offers a conceptual framework for separating the state’s responsibilities 
and legitimate ends in relation to victims, and the state’s responsibilities and legitimate ends 
in relation to offenders, thereby facilitating the design of a track appropriate to each. This 
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framework consequently offers a way of recognising potential conflicts and mitigating 
potential harms that may occur when one party is asked to participate in the other track. 
Victims will be asked to participate in the offender-oriented track in so far as their 
testimony is necessary for establishment of the facts; however, the potential for this 
involvement to run counter to the victim-centred aims of the victim-oriented track needs to 
be acknowledged and as much as possible minimised.59 Here, existing models for reform 
include the innovations introduced for young or vulnerable witnesses to give evidence 
remotely or – if their presence in court is genuinely required – from behind a screen.  Clear 
protocols on the proper limits of cross-examination – which can heighten the adversarial 
nature of the criminal proceedings, fostering prejudicial treatment of both victims and 
offenders – are also important, and recent developments show them to be  far more 
practicable than has often been assumed.60  In parallel to these reforms, the victim-oriented 
track itself should provide support for victims in managing their emotions and practical 
lives as the prosecution and trial process of the offender-oriented track unfolds.  
Fourth, we can also learn from reflection on existing models for criminal injuries 
compensation – a key concern for many victims.  Evidently, there are important differences 
between at least three possibilities: a self-standing statutory compensation mechanism 
which proceeds separately from the criminal process; an independent civil action for 
damages; and a legal mechanism such as that existing in several civilian countries which 
allows victims to attach a civil case for compensation to criminal proceedings. Arguably, in 
keeping with the line of argument offered here, the establishment of criminal offences with 
direct victims as a category of conduct expressing a distinctive public notion of wrongdoing 
itself implies a statutory duty to provide an autonomous mechanism for criminal injuries 
compensation.  But – even leaving aside the fact that such compensation will in many cases 
be symbolic rather than material – it must be seen in the context of the public obligation to 
meet victims’ interests and needs. Crucially, therefore – and in stark contrast to civil actions 
of various forms – such a scheme should be cast as a state act of recognition, healing, and 
restoration, and not as a payback primarily due from the offender. 
Fifth and finally, given that victims do sometimes express a wish for communication 
with the offender, a dual process approach should have the resources to facilitate – though it 
should not mandate – apologies or other forms of direct recompense in certain specific 
                                                          
59 Offenders may also be asked to participate in the victim-oriented track, when victims express a 
wish for direction communication and reparation; see below. 
60  See for example the toolkits prepared for advocates by the Advocates’ Gateway, hosted by the 
Inns of Court College of Advocacy:  https://www.theadvocatesgateway.org/toolkits (accessed 7 
September 2017).  
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contexts. As restorative justice offers an obvious model, we turn now to consider both the 
affinities and oppositions between a dual process approach and restorative justice.  
 
7. A Dual Process Approach and Restorative Justice 
 
Restorative justice practices and their articulation within the criminal justice process vary 
widely across jurisdictions.  What all share however is an aspiration to work towards a 
restorative and reconciliatory outcome – as well as a reduction in the risk of future 
offending – via a confrontation between a victim (or victim representative) and an offender, 
often mediated by a third party and involving other participants acting as either neutral 
parties or ‘supporters’ of each side.  In the central role in the process accorded to victims as 
well as the emphasis on addressing their interests and needs, restorative justice is typically 
considered a ‘victim-centric’ approach, and as such bears some affinity to a dual process 
approach. Nonetheless, in the forms instantiated in or alongside modern criminal justice 
systems, it is a single process approach, aiming to achieve various ends within one process, 
and embodying the intuition that justice is owed to victims and served in large part by 
demands placed on the offender – including participation in the process, community 
accountability, acknowledgement of wrongdoing, apology, and reparation. For all its 
affinities, it is therefore in key ways at odds with the approach advocated here. 
Inevitably, views about the merits and impact of restorative justice vary. Consonant 
with some of the motivations we have adduced in favour of a dual process approach, Andrew 
Ashworth notes that, although restorative justice is supposed to heal wounds, restore 
relationships, and reduce re-offending, ‘there is no evidence it can do all these things 
satisfactorily, and it seems likely that a focus on one may not enhance others’.61 Conversely, 
there is evidence that, at least when enacted as a successful ritual, wherein a kind of 
emotional synchrony between victim and offender is achieved, restorative justice can be a 
positive experience for both.62  It has also been argued that the interpersonal process 
                                                          
61 Ashworth (n 37 above) 93. 
62 Meredith Rossner, Just Emotions: Rituals of Restorative Justice (Oxford University Press 2013); for a 
classic statement of the case for restorative justice, see John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and 
Reintegration (Cambridge University Press 1989). Experimental studies suggest that, even when 
victims believe they will be satisfied by punishment alone, punishment that is accompanied by 
offender acknowledgement and apology – such as can occur in restorative justice processes when 
successfully facilitated – produces more victim satisfaction. See Victoria McGeer and Friederike 
Funk, ‘Are “Optimistic” Theories of Criminal Justice Psychologically Feasible? The Probative Case 
of Civic Republicanism’ (2015) Criminal Law and Philosophy 1. 
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embodied in a restorative justice approach both represents what victims want,63 and serves 
to reduce the risk of future offending.64  Any full evaluation of restorative justice is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  Rather, what we want to emphasise is that the instantiation of a 
dual track process has the capacity to mitigate or even remove a number of key difficulties 
restorative justice faces: fairness, side-taking, and the potential for coercion. 
Why should adherence to a dual track process underpin the possibility of good 
restorative justice practices?  One key difficulty faced by restorative justice is guaranteeing 
equality before the law and fairness as between victims and offenders.  In the case of an 
unduly powerful offender or an unduly vulnerable victim (or vice versa) it is hard to rule out 
pressure to participate in restorative practices, and difficult for the facilitator to be sure that 
the outcome is a fair one, undistorted by power relations. Indeed, we described above the 
threat that VPS’s can pose to ensuring equal treatment before the law – and to keeping 
emotional dynamics conducive to affective blame at bay. This, we suggest, is mirrored in 
restorative justice; side-taking concerns perhaps even more so, as the kinds of psychological 
processes conducive to side-taking may be heightened in smaller groups and more intimate 
settings. In addition, for restorative justice to be successful, both participants must be 
willing and able to participate fully; yet this condition may not be met. On the one hand, 
offenders may not be able – at the time of the restorative justice circle – to reflect and 
acknowledge the offence and offer a genuine apology, due to their own psychological state 
of readiness, in which case one of the main reparative tools of restorative justice for victims 
is unavailable and victims may rightly feel that closure has not been achieved. On the other 
hand, victims may be unready or unable to reconcile let alone forgive, in which case one of 
the main rehabilitative tools of restorative justice for offenders is unavailable. Indeed, 
compelling either party to participate in a restorative justice process – given the 
psychological demands on each – is not only likely to negatively impact on the outcome but 
is also arguably unjust.  
Hence despite its purported victim-centric orientation, restorative justice risks 
placing undue burdens on victims. The reason a dual process approach helps to resolve 
these problems is very simple. It sets up a process which caters effectively and justly for the 
interests and needs of both victims and offenders.  It therefore reduces the likelihood that 
power imbalances and side-taking have an impact on the outcome, or that victims feel 
pressure to participate as the only way to have their needs recognised and met or, 
alternatively, for the sake of the community or the offender.  A dual process approach 
                                                          
63 Heather Strang, Repair or Revenge: Victims and Restorative Justice (Oxford University Press 2002). 
64 Hoyle (n 3 above).  
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therefore maximises the chances that restorative justice is selected only in cases for which it 
is truly appropriate.  
   
8. Conclusion 
 
On the one hand, in so far as a single process approach requires a certain form of victim 
participation to serve offender-related ends, and offender participation to serve victim-
related needs and interests – as in restorative justice – it is not only hostage to that 
participation, but arguably asks something of both parties, but of victims in particular, 
which we may feel uncomfortable with or indeed view as straightforwardly wrong. On the 
other hand, in so far as a single process approach focusses on victim interests and needs in 
so far as these are satiated by punishment of the offender, it risks sidelining genuine concern 
for the overall wellbeing of victims by the call for ‘just deserts’. The solution, we have 
argued, lies in a centralised dual process approach to a modern criminal justice system, with 
one track of the system designed to serve the interests and needs of victims, and one track of 
the system designed to determine criminal responsibility and convict and sentence 
offenders, in such a way as to promote reform and rehabilitation to the best of the system’s 
ability. The two tracks with their key participants will no doubt be required to interact to 
some extent – particularly in relation to the need for victims to act as witnesses, and desires 
of either party for apology and direct recompense. A dual process approach nonetheless 
offers a framework to clearly separate as a matter of principle the various ends which a 
centralised, state-initiated criminal justice system ought to serve, thereby increasing the 
likelihood that they are in fact met in practice, and providing a clear rationale for when – 
and how – such interaction can best be facilitated for both parties. 
  Such a system is therefore, we argue, far preferable to the current single process 
approach, which muddies justice with vengeance by inviting the equation of justice for 
victims with punishment of offenders. But we suspect this intuition may be part of any 
residual resistance – apart from the evident practical challenges – to exploring the dual 
process alternative we have articulated. We end, therefore, with one final argument for its 
rejection. The intuition that justice is served to victims through punishment of the offender 
– if it is not to be interpreted as an empirical claim as to what brings most victim 
satisfaction, in which case it is of questionable truth65 – seems to express, as Hart put it, a 
‘mysterious piece of moral alchemy in which the combination of the two evils of moral 
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wickedness are transmuted into good’.66 What, in reality, does a tit-for-tat style revenge-
alchemy offer victims?  Without further justification, there ought to be no place for such 
ideology in contemporary legal systems – retributive and non-retributive alike – which aim 
to fashion more measured and nuanced responses to crime, potentially serving forward-
looking considerations expressive of the values of a broadly liberal society, including 
inclusion and reintegration of all offenders, alongside the imperative to hold offenders 
responsible and to account. Hence, until this intuition can be adequately clarified and 
upheld, the empirical as well as principled grounds in favour of rejecting a single process 
approach are overwhelming; and, if indeed the intuition that justice for victims proceeds via 
punishment of offenders is at some point made good, it must yet be weighed against these 
other concerns. To return to our initial analogy, we accordingly conclude that, as with 
therapy, so too with criminal justice – we need a track for victims and a track for offenders.  
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